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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20020027-CA
v.
Jose Daniel Robinson,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme
By reason of the failure of appellee to file appellee's
brief within the time permitted by Utah R. App. P. 26(a), which
time expired on June 26, 2002, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case
will be submitted to the court on appellant's brief only;
provided, however, that if appellee's brief is submitted within
seven (7) days from the date hereof, such brief will be accepted
for submission without further order of the court.
Dated this ^jl
FOR IJIB-^eQURT:

day of July, 2002.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 3.°\
day of July, 2002, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 14 0854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
SHELDEN R. CARTER
HARRIS & CARTER
3325 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 200
JAMESTOWN SQ CLOCKTOWER BLDG
PROVO UT 84604
Dated this

^*?

asr^*Jf

day of July, 2002.
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Case No.: 20020027-CA
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, #001403840

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20020027-CA

JOSE DANIEL ROBINSON,
Defendant/Appellee. :
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order dismissing one count of
manslaughter, a second degree felony.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the magistrate err when it dismissed the manslaughter
charge against defendant after the state adduced sufficient
evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a reasonable
belief that he acted recklessly in retrieving, handling, and
discharging a loaded handgun while under the influence of
alcohol?
Whether to bind a defendant over for trial on a criminal
charge presents a question of law.

On appeal, that determination

is reviewed for correctness, with no deference accorded the
1

magistrate's decision.

State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 8, 20 P.3d

300 (citing State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205, governing manslaughter, provides
in pertinent part:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another[.]
Utah Code Ann.

§76-5-205(1) (a) (1999) .

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103, providing definitions for
culpable mental states, provides in pertinent part:
A person engages in conduct:
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3) (1999) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of
manslaughter (R. 1 ) . After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate
dismissed the charge for lack of "probable cause to believe that
defendant's actions were reckless" (R. 32-33).

2

This timely

appeal followed (R. 34-35) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On June 9, 2000, defendant came home from work late in the
evening and joined his sister-in-law in the living room, where
they drank beer and watched television together (R. 36 at 10).
At about 1:15 a.m., defendant went to his bedroom and retrieved a
.38 handgun that he kept in his closet (Id. at 11). Returning to
the living room, defendant handed the gun to his sister-in-law,
who was seated on the sofa.

He sat down opposite her, about six

feet away, on a love seat (Id. at 12).
As his sister-in-law was handling the gun, defendant heard
the slide activate.

He went over to her, asked for the gun back,

and returned to the love seat (Id.).

Noticing that the barrel of

the gun was protruding slightly and thinking that the weapon
might be jammed, defendant pulled the slide back to clear out any
obstruction (Id. at 13). As he did so, a round ejected and fell
to his feet.
clip (Id.).

Defendant picked up the bullet and put it in the
According to defendant, the gun was either in his

hand or resting on his leg at this point.

The next thing

defendant remembered was that the gun fired.

He then looked over

towards his sister-in-law and saw her slumped over the arm rest
of the couch (Id.).

She had been hit in the neck by a bullet

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah
1999)(citations omitted).
3

from his gun.

She died shortly thereafter from the injury (Id.

at 7-8).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only issue in this case is whether the evidence of
defendant's recklessness was sufficient to sustain a bmdover on
the manslaughter charge.
The probable cause threshold for bmdover at a preliminary
hearing is not high.

The prosecution is charged only with

producing a sufficient quantum of evidence "to support a
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant committed it."

State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, § 16, 20

P.3d 300 (citation omitted).

In assessing whether the evidence

established a reasonable belief, the magistrate views all
evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.

State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,

1229 (Utah 1995)(citation omitted).

Because the state's evidence

will likely only get stronger between the time of the preliminary
hearing and the time of trial, even "close calls" should result
in bmdover.

Id.

The evidence reached this threshold for bmdover as a matter
of law.

The preliminary hearing court had before it evidence

that defendant, who had been drinking, retrieved a handgun from
his bedroom and gave it to his sister-in-law (R. 36 at 10-11).
When he heard the slide activate, he took the gun back (Id. at

4

12).

The evidence also showed that defendant pulled the slide

back, ejecting a bullet on the floor.

He then consciously

replaced the bullet in the clip (Xd. at 13). And the evidence
showed that the gun subsequently fired, killing the victim (Id.
at 7, 13). Under the circumstances, the evidence and fair
inferences that could be drawn from it establish at least a
reasonable belief that defendant was actually*aware of but
disregarded a significant risk of harm and that disregarding the
risk constituted a gross deviation from what a reasonable person
would do.

Accordingly, the magistrate erred when it refused to

bind the case over for trial.
ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE MANSLAUGHTER CHARGE
BECAUSE THE STATE ADDUCED
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO SUPPORT A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT
ACTED RECKLESSLY IN RETRIEVING,
HANDLING, AND DISCHARGING A LOADED
HANDGUN WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALCOHOL
The magistrate in this case refused to bind defendant over
on the charge of manslaughter and dismissed the case.
doing, the magistrate ruled:
Having heard the evidence in this case,
this court concludes that, as a matter of
law, there is not probable cause that
defendant was aware of but consciously
disregarded a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that his conduct might result in the
death of another. This court also finds that
5

In so

any risk which did exist was not of such a
nature and degree that its disregard would be
a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise.
Accordingly, this court finds that this
matter should be dismissed.
R. 32-33 or addendum A.

While the magistrate's ruling states the

law of recklessness correctly, it fails to apply that law to the
specific facts of the case in light of the quantum of evidence
necessary to support a bindover.

When the proper standard is

applied to the facts, the error in the magistrate's ruling
becomes clear.
To bind a defendant over for trial, the prosecution must
demonstrate probable cause "by present[ing] sufficient evidence
to establish that 'the crime charged has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it.'"

State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d

1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2)).

The

evidence necessary to establish probable cause at this stage of
the proceedings is "relatively low because the assumption is that
the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the
investigation continues."

Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 182

(Utah 1998)(citing Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229).

Thus, a

preliminary hearing court must bind over for trial whenever the
state presents "sufficient evidence to support a
belief

reasonable

that an offense has been committed and that the defendant

committed it."

State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, § 16, 20 P.3d 300

(citation omitted)(emphasis added).
6

This is the same quantum of

evidence necessary to support an arrest warrant.

Id.

The

magistrate, in making this determination, "should view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve
all inferences in favor of the prosecution."

Pledger, 896 P.2d

at 1229.
In order to establish a reckless mental state, the State had
to demonstrate both subjective and objective components of
defendant's perception of the risk.2

State v. Singer, 815 P. 2d

1303, 1307 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523,
525-26 (Utah App. 1989)).

First, from a subjective standpoint,

the state had to show that defendant was aware of but consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct
could result in the death of another.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

103(3)(1999); Singer, 815 P.2d at 1307.

And second, from an

objective standpoint, the State had to show that the risk was of
such a nature and degree that disregarding it amounted to a gross
deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person in
defendant's position would have exercised.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

2-103(3); Singer, 815 P.2d at 1307; Wessendorf, 777 P.2d at 526;

2

On a continuum of mental states, "recklessness is not
marked by a sharp analytical line." State v. Singer, 815 P.2d
1303, 1307 (Utah App. 1991). Whether conduct has crossed over
into recklessness is "[i]n essence[,] . . . a matter of judging
when conduct is no longer just gray but dark gray." Id. Once
the state establishes a reasonable belief that defendant acted
recklessly, then the magistrate should bind over, leaving the
ultimate determination of whether defendant acted recklessly to
the jury. See State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
7

State v

Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983).

Measuring the

evidence of defendant's conduct against the correct legal
standard for a bmdover demonstrates the legal error m

the

magistrate's conclusion that the state failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant
acted recklessly.
First, the evidence reflects that defendant subjectively
knew of the specific risks inherent in his conduct.

While the

gun was in his sister-in-law's possession, defendant heard the
slide activate and responded by immediately taking the gun away
from her (R. 36 at 12). The fair inference from this conduct is
that the sound of the slide activating alerted defendant to an
increased risk of serious harm, to which he responded by
regaining possession of his weapon (Id.).

Defendant also knew,

by the bulge in the barrel, that something was mechanically amiss
with his gun (Id. at 13).

In response, he pulled back the slide

and saw a bullet fall out (Id.).
the bullet in the clip (Id.).

He then consciously replaced

At this juncture, he actually knew

that the gun contained at least one live round.

Indeed, his own

volitional act had loaded the gun.
It is reasonable to infer that one who possesses a gun knows
that pointing it at another human being in a potentially loaded
condition is a risky proposition.

In this case, after defendant

replaced the bullet in the gun, the gun discharged and hit the

8

victim in the neck (Id. at 8 ) . The only fair inference from this
fact is that the gun, which was in defendant's possession, was
pointed at the victim when it discharged.
The evidence also demonstrates that defendant consciously
disregarded the risk inherent in playing with guns.

The state

adduced evidence that defendant had been drinking between 10:30
p.m., when he arrived home from work, and 1:15 a.m., when the
shooting occurred (R. 36 at 10-11). 3

After taking the weapon

back from his sister-in-law, defendant consciously pulled back
the slide and, instead of unloading the gun, chose to reload the
magazine, which he then knew contained at least one live round
(Id. at 13). Defendant thus disregarded the substantial risk
inherent in handling a deadly weapon, which directly resulted in
his sister-m-law' s death.
Second, the State adduced evidence pointing to the lethal
combination of a loaded gun and intoxication.

This combination

suffices to establish probable cause that defendant's conduct,
when viewed objectively, constituted a gross deviation from the
standard of care an ordinary person in defendant's position would
have exercised.

State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah

1981)(exploring parameters of "gross deviation" and concluding

3

After the shooting, according to the investigating
detective, defendant "appeared intoxicated" (R. 36 at 16). A
subsequent toxicology report, showing a blood level of .10,
confirmed the officer's observation (R. 8 ) .
9

that the divergence must be "extreme"); State v. Whitehead, 2001
UT App 385 (concluding that defendant's handling of gun in close
proximity to others constituted "gross deviation" supporting a
finding of recklessness where he knew that his action would load
the gun); cf. State v. McPhee, 684 P.2d 57, 58 (Utah
1984)(concluding that the conduct of defendant, who drank half a
bottle of vodka, drove, and subsequently killed a child on a
bicycle, constituted a "gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary prudent person would indulge").
Under the record facts of this case, because the magistrate
had sufficient evidence before it to establish probable cause
that defendant acted recklessly, it should have bound defendant
over for trial and left adjudication of the merits to the trier
of fact.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the
magistrate's order dismissing the case and order that defendant
be bound over for trial on one count of manslaughter, a second
degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 1 day of May, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellant were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Sheldon Carter, attorney for appellee, 3325 North
University Avenue, #200, Provo, Utah 84604, this cr\
2002.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Plaintiff,

Case No. 001403840

-vs-

JUDGE: GARY D. STOTT

JOSE DANIEL ROBINSON

i

Defendant(s).

This is a prosecution for Manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony in violation of
UCA 76-5-205. On September 6, 2001, this matter came on for a preliminary hearing. At that
hearing the following facts were established:
On or about June 10, 2001, defendant was at home with the his sister-in-law, the victim,
Christina Galbraith. Both defendant and the victim were drinking. At some point during the
evening, defendant retrieved a .380 semiautomatic pistol and showed it to the victim. After the
victim handled the gun, defendant took the gun and cocked it by pulling back on the slide.
When defendant pulled back the slide on the gun, a bullet was ejected and fell on the
carpet. Defendant retrieved the bullet and replaced it in the clip of the gun. Defendant was either
holding the gun in his hand or on his lap when it discharged.
The gun fired a bullet which struck the victim in the head immediately behind the left ear.

Page 1 of 2

The victim died as a result of this injury.
The cnme of manslaughter requires that the actor "recklessly causes the death of another
. . . . " UCA 76-5-205(1 )(a). In this case, it is undisputed that defendant has caused the death of
another. The court however, does not believe that there is probable cause to believe that
defendant's actions were reckless. Specifically, the term "recklessly" means that the actor acted:
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct
or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
UCA 76-2-103(3)
Having heard the evidence in this case, this court concludes that, as a matter of law, there
is not probable cause that defendant was aware of but consciously disregarded a "substantial and
unjustifiablerisk"that his conduct might result in the death of another. This court also finds that
any risk which did exist was not of such a nature and degree that its disregard would be a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise. Accordingly, this
court finds that this matter should be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

h V*/

District Court .radge
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